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10.
Everybody Hates Rainbows
D.E. WITTKOWER

“The Culture Industry.” Does that phrase make you as uncomfortable as it makes me? Culture shouldn’t be an industry; it
should be something natural and organic. Culture is our communal history and legacy; the context in which we learn and grow, and
to which we may contribute. In the past, our culture might have
consisted of the stories we learned as children, the songs we all
sang together, perhaps traditional clothing or dances. In some
sense, it’s hard to imagine today.
Our culture, to whatever extent we have a culture, might still
consist of stories (Disney), songs (the Jeopardy! theme), clothing
(Prada), and dances (The Electric Slide). But these elements are
integrated within the marketplace, and, if not produced out of an
explicit profit motive, they are at least taken up into a system of
economic control and exploitation.
It’s a strange thing to consider that an element of culture as
basic as, for example, the song “Happy Birthday to You,” has an
owner. I’m not making this up. It’ll be under copyright until the
year 2030. That’s why big chain restaurants don’t sing it—they’d
have to pay royalties. Oh, and who owns it? Half the rights are
held by AOL Time-Warner. The other half is owned by the estate
of Patty Hill Smith (died 1946) who wrote a different song (in
123
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1893) which “Happy Birthday” was based on. Consult Snopes if
ye doubt.
When Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer came up with
the phrase, “the Culture Industry,” they used it to describe how
profit-motivated capitalist production had fundamentally changed
the role that art played in our lives. Instead of offering an alternative to the very limited view of the world offered by our lives as
economic actors, industrially-produced music and film helps to
integrate us even further into the cycle of mindless production to
support mindless consumption. “Amusement under late capitalism,” they wrote in 1944, “is the prolongation of work.”
Since then, of course, many things have changed. The movie
studios have had to open up to indie films and alternative entertainment options, and the whole game will undoubtedly change
even more in a couple years when the YouTube generation takes
over. The monolithic system of record labels, radio stations, and
payola has been broken, and, while a great many cultural choices
are still in the hands of a very few huge corporations, finding alternate media outlets is becoming easier and easier. Despite this,
Adorno and Horkheimer’s fundamental point is as relevant as
ever: as long as cultural products are industrial goods, they will be
basically inhuman and dehumanizing. They wrote then that “personality scarcely signifies anything more than shining white teeth
and freedom from body odor and emotions.” As long as we continue to confuse self-identity with brand-recognition, even something as personal as our experience of music will suffer from a
fundamental disconnect.
But alternate, less industrialized ways of making and enjoying
music are becoming more prominent, and, even though Adorno
and Horkheimer might not have been too hopeful about what this
might mean, I think it might offer us a way towards a healthier
relationship with art. Let me tell you why.
House of Cards
With digital media, it’s become possible to encounter music in
many different forms and contexts. From streaming media and
MySpace to leaks and BitTorrent, the context of record labelbased centralized sales distribution is being torn down at every
front. The days when it made sense to think about music as an
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object for sale (an “album”), just like an apple or a pair of pants,
are long gone, and the RIAA’s ad campaigns will never bring them
back.
We post songs on our Facebook pages, we share tracks with
our iPods and Zunes,1 and, yes, we illegally download. In a way,
musical recordings are becoming more like what they used to be—
one of a number of different ways that different forms of music
and performance enter our lives. Regardless, the CD is becoming
an increasingly unimportant site for us to encounter and enjoy
music.
There has always been a kind of basic tension here, though.
Music is expressive, and the idea of transforming something fundamentally communicative into a commodity for sale has always been a
bit of a house of cards. For example, consider what’s happened
in print publications. There’s a similar tension there between
information as commodity and as communication, and with the
new opportunities for self-publication and open access, a great
deal of the material which used to be bought and sold is now
downloaded or accessed online. Think of all the books that
Wikipedia—for better or worse—has replaced in the life of the
average student!
And even within a purely market-mediated experience of
music, the fan has always encountered music as an expression and
a communication—from the fan-perspective, music as a commodity has always been only a necessary evil and an unwelcome precondition. In musical subcultures, economic factors are usually
viewed as directly hostile to what listeners perceive as the “real”
value of music. Otherwise, the charge of having “sold out”
wouldn’t make any sense—after all, shouldn’t we be happy that
musicians who we like will be able to enjoy a larger following?
Once there was a glimmer of hope that this evil will no longer
be necessary, listeners, unsurprisingly, rushed to embrace these
alternate, de-commodified modes of listening and enjoying music.
1 Sorry to use an obscure term here. “Zune” is a word that was used for a
short time in late 2006 to early 2007 in the United States—it referred to an
object that was able to wirelessly share songs. It is suspected that some
of these may actually exist in the hands of consumers, although studies
have been inconclusive. Some believe that one can be seen in frame 351
of the so-called Patterson-Gimlin film.
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At the turn of the century, the sudden freedom from economic
constrictions opened our desktops and playlists to virtually limitless world of new and exciting sounds, and although things have
certainly changed since those heady days of Napster—and most
music fans today continue to regard commodification as a necessary evil—still, the public perception of the role of economics in
music has been permanently altered. I think there’s something to
be said for comparing the current digital rights management
(DRM) efforts to trying to get the toothpaste back in the tube, but
that’s a discussion for another day. Whether or not the effort to
close down filesharing is doomed, it is clear at least that there is
now a real desire on the part of fans to think about music as just
another object for sale in the marketplace.
Jigsaw Falling into Place
Rightly or wrongly, there’s a strong public perception that labels
pass on stunningly little of music profits to musicians. But what’s
the alternative model? Should bands treat their recorded music as
little other than advertisements for performances, and should we
start to think of music as a service rather than a product? Should
we go back to a patronage model, where shares of an album are
sponsored by fans? Are online ad-based revenues enough to keep
bands going? Could they use an up-sale model, where additional
content or access can be purchased? Perhaps a shareware model
will work, where a great many fans might choose to donate just a
few dollars, or where long-tailing can support a project just on a
relatively few dedicated hard-core fans.
These models have been tried by different artists, such as
Jonathan Coulton, Trent Reznor, and Maria Schneider. These
models have succeeded, but this success has been limited to relatively small and loyal fan bases, and these models remain unfamiliar and strange to the majority of listeners. To succeed on a large
scale—large enough of a scale to offer alternative business model
attractive to a wide variety of musicians—they would need a familiar public face and a prominent success story. With In Rainbows,
the shattered and fragmented system of music distribution and
acquisition began to look, to some, like a jigsaw puzzle falling into
place. Radiohead, a highly regarded band with a very strong inter-
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national following, was adopting a DRM-free, pay-what-you-feel
downloadable distribution model! They would show that it can be
done; that this is, at least in one prominent case, a viable business
model.
The fit, for the fan, was a very natural one. Instead of paying
for the object on the basis of the costs incurred—or perhaps just
the industry-standard pricing model—you would pay for your own
perceived use-value that the product delivered. What could be
more fair from a consumer perspective? Of course, the problems
were numerous. Most notably, you were asked to pay upon download, before listening to the album and determining its value to you.
But still, this was a hopeful sign that real change might be on its
way.
To the industry, of course, this looked like a dangerous betrayal. If it succeeded, this would only feed the perception that labels
are unnecessary intermediaries, and would cover over the supposed necessity of paying all the producers, executives, marketing
people, lawyers, and so on. Legitimating a user-consumer-centered
sales model further undermined the basic business model of the
industry. At the same time, the fact that Radiohead reverted back
to a traditional sales model rather than seeing the experiment
through made this respect for and legitimation of listener-centered pricing into a mere gimmick to increase hype. So, in the end,
it didn’t really make anybody happy. Trent Reznor, for example,
called it “insincere” and a “marketing gimmick,” while—on the
other side of the issue—James Blunt suggested that the pay-whatyou-feel approach would “devalue” music, saying “I’ve got to pay
a band and a producer and a mixer.”
The labels have grounds for complaint—after all, they are
playing in accordance with the rules. Of course, they helped make
up those rules through lobbying Congress, but they are the rules.
Furthermore, they did spend a good deal of money producing and
marketing music that they have a legal basis to expect to be able to
sell. Just because it’s free to download doesn’t mean it was free to
make, and they have a legitimate expectation to be able to recoup
their costs. The bigger issue, of course, is whether the business
model is sustainable in the digital age, and whether it is exploitative and undeserving of protection or preservation.
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So, how do we adjudicate between these different claims—that
music is a commercial product to be bought and sold, and that is
communication and should be free, and artists should be supported in some other way? Who deserves what here, and are the established property rights to be respected and preserved?
Reckoner
In political philosophy and in applied ethics, we regularly deal with
the question of how to justly distribute limited resources.
Probably the most famous and influential philosophical perspective on distributive justice is that of the American philosopher
John Rawls.
Rawls’s 1971 book, A Theory of Justice, really changed the conversation going on in political philosophy. He put forth an ideal
of ‘justice as fairness’: he wanted to construct an ideal of justice
appropriate for liberal democracies; one which would not be
dependent on any particular ideas of right and wrong, or of the
nature of the “good life.” He claimed that, if we were able to
ignore our own self-interested assumptions, based on the part of
society in which we find ourselves and what we stand to gain or
lose, we would all agree to distribute limited resources such as economic and political opportunity approximately as follows:
1. Everybody gets a robust set of basic rights and freedoms;
as great as can be given alike to everybody, and
2. Whatever inequality there is should benefit the least
among us.
How does he get to these principles? Let’s start with his claim
that we all basically agree on the egalitarian principle that we
should all, ideally, have the same rights and opportunities as each
other, and nobody should enjoy special benefits or favors. But if
we were to, for example, all enjoy the same income no matter what
we did, then we’d all be worse off! We wouldn’t feel we were
rewarded for our efforts, and we wouldn’t be motivated to achieve
greater things, and our entire economy and society would stagnate
and suffer.
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So, even on an egalitarian basis, inequality is good, at least to
some extent. But to what extent? There’s a classic problem in utilitarian theories of distributive justice—it has a number of different forms, but one of them is this: imagine a group of four people in a room. They have a pleasant conversation for an hour,
resulting in, say, ten hedons, or arbitrary units of happiness (just
assume we can measure that, okay?) per person, for a net gain of
forty hedons. Okay, now imagine that they’re sadists. If three of
them torture the fourth, we get, say, a gain of a hundred hedons
each for the three torturers, and a loss of two hundred hedons for
the fourth poor fellow, for a net gain of 100 hedons. So, if we use
a pretty basic (and silly) interpretation of utilitarianism’s basic
claim that the right action is the one that results in the greatest
overall happiness, then it seems that the utilitarian would have to
prefer that the sadists torture the fourth fellow.
Now, that’s not fair to the utilitarian position, and Rawls
knows better than to use such a simplistic example, but it does
demonstrate his point: we need to take into consideration the
importance, not just of net gain of benefit, but of how that gain
is distributed among persons. So, he says, we should allow
inequality to increase only until it comes at the expense of anybody
within the society. So, that rules out the sadist circumstance, and
the four are left just having a pleasant conversation. In which, presumably, they politely avoid talking about how much they’d like to
put the screws to the fourth fellow.
That’s the basic idea. Having a fair system of distributive justice would guarantee a basic set of benefits to everybody, and
would only allow as much inequality as is still for the best for
everybody. In the abstract, this sounds pretty uncontroversial.
But what would this mean in practice? Let’s look at the question
of distribution of wealth.
If some of us have wealth holdings, for example, of around
$190,000, and others of around $5,500, then it is hard to see how
even roughly similar kinds of opportunities for education, competition in the marketplace, or success in general could be enjoyed
throughout our society. Those are, however, the median holdings
of the uppermost and lowest quintiles of our population (as of
2002, sorted by income).2 So those two very disparate and
2 US Census Bureau data, taken from “Net Worth and the Assets of
Households: 2002,” available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/
p70-115.pdf.
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unequal groups represent forty percent of our society—the rest of
us are in the middle somewhere. Furthermore, this inequality has
a clearly racial component: the median net worth of non-Hispanic
White households is $87,056, while that of Black householders is
$5,446.
Even if you think that explicit racism and bigotry is widespread in the US today, this still doesn’t seem like enough to
explain this inequality. Instead, we need to say this: the rich tend
to get richer, and the poor tend to stay poor. So, if we want the
kind of real freedom of opportunity that would allow the legacy
of racist disenfranchisement to even out, in time, we need to narrow the gap between rich and poor. Rawls’s perspective would
clearly call for a redistribution of wealth through something like a
progressive income tax, or some other way of lessening the advantage of those born wealthy, and providing expanded opportunities
for those born poor.
Up on the Ladder
The predictable response is that it would be unjust to treat wealthy
individuals differently in order to benefit others in society. Surely,
after all, a basic principle of justice is that like cases should be
treated in a like manner, so how can you justify taxing people at
different rates? Don’t we have basic property rights? If I obtained
my holdings without force or fraud, how can the government be
justified in taking a disproportionate share of them? With regard
to the racial inequality, rich Whites, placed high up on our ladder
by the accidents of birth and family might ask: I didn’t enslave
anybody, why should I have to pay for the crimes of dead people
who happen to share my skin color?
There is clearly something to be said for this response. This
comes into even sharper relief when we look at the example of
affirmative action. From a larger perspective, we see systematic
disadvantages in the market. While this takes many forms, perhaps the most dramatic is the cycle of poverty in Black America,
where those from impoverished backgrounds are less likely to
have the same educational and economic opportunities, leaving
them with little time and energy to raise their own children, who
grow up in depressed areas with underfunded public schools. At
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the same time, from the smaller, local perspective, the employer
might ask, “why should I hire the person I think is less qualified
just because he shares a skin color with a group of people who
tend to suffer from disadvantages?” The White job applicant
might ask, “why should I be disadvantaged just because of my
skin color?”
There are many arguments on both sides here, and very good
points have been made about, for example, how ‘reverse discrimination’ is not wrong in the way that racial discrimination is wrong,
or how our rights in the marketplace are all based on having a
healthy marketplace, so economic redistribution or affirmative
action are justifiable because they are necessary for there to be a
healthy marketplace. These may be right, but they cover over an
important point: if we respect universal basic property rights, then
the wealthy are right to complain of unequal treatment; and if we
think skin color should be irrelevant, then acting on the basis of
whiteness is wrong too.
In my view, the problem isn’t that one side is clearly fair and
the clearly unfair—the problem is that the world isn’t fair. If we
pay attention to the social problems, we violate individual rights
and fail to respect those who happen to be advantaged. If we pay
attention to individual rights, we allow people remain in the cycle
of poverty, and for racial and economic disparities to widen.
Either way, we fail to respect what seem to be to be serious claims
about what is just and unjust. Personally, I’d rather work towards
social justice, even if it means failing to properly respect individual rights, because the way in which the wealthy and privileged suffer is inconsequential compared to the way in which the poor and
disadvantaged suffer. To put it a bit overdramatically, I’d rather
disrespect property rights than have people live without enough
food or safe housing. It’s not a simple matter, and both sides
deserve to be taken seriously, but that doesn’t mean that there isn’t
a right choice.
Go Slowly
Now, what would Rawls say about Rainbows? It’s a very different
case, of course, but I think we can see a few places where Rawls’s
discussion of distributive justice helps us think about how In
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Rainbows might help us go slowly towards finding a good solution
here.
Can we give everybody the right to listen to music as they
please, and to download and share music as they see fit? In other
words, to have the right to enjoy music as a part of our culture,
rather than as part of an industry?
Let’s look back at Rawls’s first principle. Rawls thinks we
should all hold whatever liberties can be given alike to everybody.
Back when only a big record label would be able to support, develop, and promote artists, we, arguably, couldn’t all hold this right,
because it interfered with the centralized machinery necessary to
create that music. Back then, it very well might have made sense
to say that it was dangerous and harmful to undermine the standard album-as-consumer-good model. Now, though, many other
models are viable, and we can’t claim that it’s irresponsible to suggest to fans that the relationship between listening to artists and
supporting artists is negotiable, and might take various different
forms. We might want to say instead that we all now ought to have
the right to listen, to rip, to share, and to burn.
Where does that leave the artist? Well, it leaves the artist looking for new ways to support herself. Is that fair to the artist?
Maybe it doesn’t seem like it is, but, on Rawls’s view, we can’t justify limiting the freedom of others unless it benefits them in the
end, and the old model of restricting listeners just isn’t a necessary
limit anymore. Models like those that Rainbows point us towards
can allow artists to survive and support themselves without doing
so at the expense of fans’ free relationship to music.
I say the same thing here as I said above about affirmative
action. Is this fair to everybody? No, probably not—but, hey, it
turns out the world isn’t fair, and that just means we need to figure out which claims about fairness are more important. And, in
my view, having a free relationship to music, and to culture in general, is more important than ensuring that musicians can keep
making money in the way they have been. Musicians made a living before the DRM-restricted download, before the CD, before
the tape, the 8-track, and before vinyl as well. What we stand to
lose is not music, or the possibility of making a living as a musician—what we stand to lose is only the narrowly commodified
relationship to music that has been in place for the last few
decades or so. And good riddance, I say.
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Labels certainly don’t need to wither and die either. When the
way that we think about rights changes, this can certainly force
some people with legitimate claims into unfortunate positions.
For example, after the Emancipation Proclamation, I’m sure there
were a good deal of Southern plantation owners who were upset
about the way that their business model had been undermined.
And why not?—they were conducting business on the basis of
what had been the law. But rights are more important than profits, and the farmers who lost their slave labor adapted or went
under.
As our thoughts about the rights of listeners changes, labels
need to adapt to the new environment. They need to start to think
of their business as providing services rather than products. They,
in the end, are in the business of finding, developing, and promoting musical talent and creativity. As artists find new ways to support themselves, labels—no longer the only show in town, so to
speak—will have to find new ways to provide valuable services to
musicians. The current movement towards “360 deals”—contracts which give labels a cut of concert, licensing, and other revenues—might allow labels to remain profitable even as listeners
are increasingly unwilling to think of music as an object to be
bought and sold. They will only have to start thinking of themselves as service providers rather than gatekeepers, and to offer
better, fairer deals to artists in order to remain relevant.
All in all, Rainbows suggests the possibility of a different future
for music—a future with new rules and perhaps with fewer profits, but certainly with more freedom. Maybe there’s no pot of gold
at the end of it, but over this rainbow, at least some of our dreams
might come true.
Music is part of our cultural heritage, and part of our social
interaction. The song which we sing along with is one which we
should be free to share, perform, and remix. Every song is an
expression, and a part of a conversation, and nobody should have
the rights to tell us what we can and cannot do with words and
sounds dear to us, and which speak to our hearts.
Yet, music is an industry, and managers, employees, and stockholders have made investments of time and money, within an
established legal regime, which they have a legitimate expectation
to be able to recover. Songs are commodities in our society, and
music given away undermines the viability of the system.
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So, where do we go from here? We must go slowly; we must
find new ways of supporting artists, and we must oppose legislation that cuts us off from our culture and that supports labels to
the detriment of artists. If we can find a clear path forward,
together, our culture may be ours again.

